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Abstract: The TacSat series of spacecraft have very short development times but also very
challenging technical goals. To meet the ambitious requirements of these programs requires a
systematic approach to change control that allows developmental payloads and subsystems to be
integrated rapidly and correctly with the rest of the spacecraft. Often this approach balances
documentation and consideration of design impacts of changes with the need for quick decision
making and rapid accommodation of changes. MSI has been involved in TacSat-2, TacSat-3,
and TacSat-4. The Roadrunner, a.k.a. TacSat-2 mission is being conducted by the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) to demonstrate techniques and methodologies to dramatically
shorten the development time required for small satellites. TacSat-II is scheduled for launch on
November 13, 2006. MSI supplied the bus for TacSat-2 and supported I&T of the system at
AFRL under Jackson & Tull. MSI was one of four bus contractors awarded a phase A study for
TacSat-3 and is one of the members of the systems engineering team supporting early TacSat-4
development. In this paper we will discuss the specific techniques used on these programs to
accommodate changes at various levels of development. We will discuss who the appropriate
decision makers should be, how to communicate changes to the team, how changes are
documented at different stages of development, and discuss some of the technical design details
that allow change to be accommodated with minimum impact. In each case we will use
examples from the TacSat and other programs to illustrate how such processes have evolved and
the implications they have on program elements such as risk management, cost control, testing
and configuration control. We will also present an update of the TacSat-2 mission status and
show how various changes during the program lifetime affected the development of the mission
from a bus contractor’s viewpoint.
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Introduction

In many ways the ability to handle change
faster is the principle attribute in allowing a
small satellite project to compress schedules
to 1-2 year developments instead of 10-15
years. The total number or severity of
changes that a small satellite program
encounters may be no more or less than a
traditional satellite program, but in order to
contain costs, these changes must be dealt
with much quicker. Achieving this fast
reaction to change without sacrificing
quality is crucial to any company’s survival
in this market niche.

Figure 1 – TacSat-2 Initial Concept

Laying the Foundation for Change

The ability to quickly and correctly
accommodate change is arguably the key
aspect of success in any small satellite
endeavor and the TacSat series has enabled
MSI to distill a number of important lessons
in this regard. As shown by Figure 1 above
and Figure 2 below, the difference between
concept and final product (MSI bus)
delivered 12 months later can be dramatic.

As with other aspects of life, the first step is
admitting that we have a problem. In the
author’s experience across many companies
and projects, there is a perception
throughout our industry that small missions
are immune from the need to plan for proper
change control. Many people believe that
because a mission happens so quickly it
won’t have time to change much. Others
believe that small budgets and limited scope
will reduce change control to a trivial task
not worth consideration.
Some ideal small satellite missions are
conducted with a single payload/purpose
that are adequately funded, politically stable,
and have secured a launch vehicle. For this
subset of missions, it is reasonable for the
team to expect a minimum number of
changes, especially if the customer has a
stated and proven dedication to minimizing
change as a method of cost containment.
For the vast majority of small satellite
missions, however, all of these initial
conditions are not met and thus the stage is
set for a wide variety of changes to be
accommodated.

Figure 2 – TacSat-2 Final Space Vehicle
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Changes arise from the need to meet the
challenges of integrating multiple payloads
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or
accomplishing
multiple
mission
objectives.
This is because increasing
complexity reduces the ability of the
designers to correctly anticipate all of the
potential interactions and interfaces between
systems. Even in missions that are ideal,
some change will always occur simply due
to the fact that as further design definition is
produced for the various elements need to
remain in synch which means a continuous
evolution of design details during
development. Additional changes arise from
a severely cost or technically constrained
mission. These additional changes arise
because margins are typically the first line
of
defense
containing
the
small
developmental changes that always occur.
In missions that are severely constrained the
lack of margin means that small changes
must be accommodated by continually reoptimizing the system to meet the stringent
goals.
Now that we have established that changes
are to be expected in small missions, the
next step is ensuring that all major
stakeholders agree on expectations for how
to deal with the changes. For this we will
consider the perspectives of the customer,
the marketing department, management and
the line engineer. Ground rules should be
established early to determine what types of
changes to expect and allow for, what
aspects will remain inviolable, and what
processes will be used to shepherd the
changes.
Marketing can help set the stage for initial
expectations of change. It is often tempting
in proposals to ignore the cost of changes
because many proposals are prepared in
response to a point design request or a fixed
set of requirements. Neglecting the dynamic
nature of requirements is a common
oversight at this stage. Pushing designs
further toward the edge of the performance
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envelope in order to win an award increases
the risk of such changes later on, a fact
which is also easy to forget at this stage.
Proposal preparation teams would be well
served to remember former AMSAT NA
President
Jan
King’s
aphorism,
“Performance, Price, or Schedule; pick any
two to optimize and don’t complain about
the third.” By now the small satellite
industry has enough experience as a whole
to be able to recognize what realistic
expectations are and we best serve our
future interests by being honest with
customers even during the sales stage of the
mission.
Once the marketing group adopts an
appropriate stance to change, the customer
and the management teams can have
meaningful discussions on the ground rules
for how to accommodate changes. This
should include things such as prioritizing the
various mission objectives to allow trades to
be conducted. Customers and management
must agree on the relative weighting to
assign performance, price, schedule and risk
in these trades. It also includes agreeing on
the various strategies and processes to
accommodate change and designating
individuals to lead this process.
The other final component, the line
engineer, must also buy into the concept of
handling change rapidly and efficiently.
This can be especially difficult for some
engineers who are used to working on the
larger traditional space programs where the
pace of change is not nearly as challenging.
It is important that team members accept
that change is going to be part of the
program. They should be prepared to redo
analyses and designs as necessary to support
shifts in requirements or new discoveries
from other areas that drive change in their
systems. It is also critical that they avoid
dwelling on complaints about being forced
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to change and instead step up to the
challenge of meeting the new requirements.
Attitudes toward accepting and dealing with
change vary widely among people in
general. For a small satellite mission to be
successful in fostering good relationships
among all participants, it is important to
select team members that display a
willingness to deal with change in a positive
fashion.
Strategies for Success
In selecting the program’s overall strategy
for success, decision makers should consider
how they wish to balance schedule, risk,
budget, and performance parameters to
achieve the mission objectives. The primary
strategies for dealing with change can be
categorized according to the various
emphases they place on these competing
objectives.
For example, on MSI’s DSX mission, the
mission timeline from initial development to
launch is fairly long for a smallsat,
approximately 6 years. To contain costs and
accelerate payload definition, the program
made an early decision to define and build
the spacecraft bus first, then use that to
define the interfaces to the payloads. This
effectively removed the possibility that
individual payload design details could drive
changes of the bus. However, as illustrated
in Figures 3 and 4, this strategy did not
make the mission immune from changes due
to the finalization of the payload manifest.
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Figure 3 – DSX Stowed Configuration As
Originally Proposed by MSI

Figure 4 – DSX Stowed Configuration As
of April 2006 (In Fabrication)
A similar set of ground rules was adopted
for TacSat-2. This program decided early
on to be “capabilities driven”, by which we
mean that the program office would adjust
the mission performance requirements to
match the capabilities of the off-the-shelf
hardware that we could acquire in time to
support the mission. This allowed bus
design and manufacturing to proceed
immediately while payload development
occurred in parallel, thereby shortening
schedule and minimizing changes that
would have budgetary impacts to the bus.
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Another MSI mission is only documenting
as built designs, eliminating the need to
revise drawings and most other documents
entirely. This approach is consistent with a
customer that has a critical need for rapid
delivery and low cost. The approach is only
compatible with very simple missions with
limited objectives that can be achieved with
a very small development team. The small
team is essential to maintaining a
coordinated
effort
where
written
documentation is cut to the bone. In this
case, it is possible to keep a handful of
people coordinated via verbal instruction
and e-mail if they are co-located. Any more
than half a dozen members offers too many
opportunities for miscommunication. The
risk posture of the customer for this mission
had a profound influence on the MSI
approach. In this case the customer is
familiar with high risk endeavors and was
willing to accept this approach to achieve
their cost and schedule targets.
One area of strategic decision making that
can have a profound affect on the ease of
accommodating changes later on is the
selection of appropriate design margins for
many key spacecraft elements. This process
is largely dependent upon engineering
judgment given the nature of the mission
and what sorts of changes are expected
during development. Categories for margins
include overall mass, cg, peak power, orbit
average power, spare switch lines, spare
analog and digital I/O, processor memory
and MFLOPS, etc. By providing adequate
margins to accommodate potential changes,
the design attains a level of flexibility that
allows changes to be compartmentalized so
that every minor alteration does not require
an intensive systematic analysis and
redesign. The difficulty lies in selecting the
right level of margins, ideally just enough to
cover the changes without wasting any
capability.
Margins that are too
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conservative can lead to spiraling capability
and cost. Margins that are too aggressive
will lead to significant impacts for even
minor changes. One pitfall in a capabilities
driven mission is the natural tendancy to
keep adding payloads or objectives until all
the capability is used up. It is important to
remember that just because a mission
decides to live within the capabilities of the
spacecraft bus, it is still prudent to maintain
a reasonable cushion on those capabilities as
a hedge against later changes.
Flexibility can also be added into the
architecture of the spacecraft by the use of
several techniques. First, keeping the basic
functionality of the spacecraft simple
protects the core functions from becoming
complex and interdependent. This allows a
mission to achieve its primary objectives
most reliably with less dependency upon
secondary systems or secondary mission
objectives. Implementing this philosophy is
an exercise in the KISS principle and is
applied to basic functions such as safe mode
and primary payload accommodation.
Secondly, designing a generic baseline of
capability allows a wider latitude in
adjusting to major changes later on. For
example, choosing a 3 axis stabilized ACS
architecture that can point any body vector
at any target provides significantly more
robustness to changing mission needs than a
gravity gradient or sun pointing only
architecture would.
Thirdly, incorporating modular, flexible
interfaces
at
key
points
prevents
accommodation
of
changes
from
propagating throughout the entire design.
Use of FPGA’s to drive the digital data
interfaces to payloads, for example, allows
many aspects of the protocol and link layers
between payloads and the bus to adapt with
little impact to the rest of the system.
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Similarly, a modular approach to software
interfaces can dramatically reduce the effort
to debug and finalize these interfaces in later
stages of the project. Specifically, one may
employ techniques like using a standard
command
and
telemetry
structure
throughout software and only translating
them to and from the specialized formats of
the hardware elements on the last software
modules (device drivers) that interface
directly with the various hardware elements.
This allows changes in the hardware
interface to be made without have to
propagate them throughout.
Finally and most importantly, flexibility in
staff roles is an extremely powerful tool in
successfully accommodating change. By
selecting team members who possess a
variety of skills across multiple disciplines
and across all stages of development, there
are far fewer individuals involved,
exponentially reducing the communication
effort involved in adjusting to changes.

People
Step 1: Offline
• Trade Studies
• Collect 80% of Impacts

Step 2: SDT Meeting
• Held Weekly
• Technical Evaluation
• Judge Need for ECF
• Team Impact Assessment
• Lead by Systems Eng.

Also, these individuals can continue to play
key roles throughout the program life cycle,
eliminating hand-off’s to new personnel and
retaining the tribal knowledge gained early
in the process. This allows them to evaluate
late breaking changes with the full
contextual knowledge of how the system
was designed in the beginning and lets them
take full advantage of the system capabilities
to accommodate such changes.
Process Mechanics
The change process follows the sequence of
first being initiated by someone on the team,
then being evaluated, a decision made, and
finally documentation and implementation.
This process as typically implemented at
MSI is graphically represented in Figure 5.
In the first part of the process changes in
traditional programs are initiated typically
by the customer through the contract
requirements or through the engineering

+

Paper
Engineering Change Form
(ECF)

Working
Groups

ECF Configuration
Controlled Documents

System
Design
Team
Meeting

ICD Documents
System Requirements
Master Equip List
Etc.

Step 3: CCB Meeting
• Class 1 and 2 Changes
• Customer and MSI Final
Approval

Configuration
Control
Board
Meeting
Computer Server Storage

Figure 5 – MSI Typical Change Process
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details. In many small satellite missions, the
need for quick reaction to change requires a
less formal relationship with the customer
that allows the bus contractor to begin
working on change impacts without waiting
for contract documentation. This should be
negotiated up front to allow maximum
flexibility to work to the customer’s
direction. Two keys enablers of success are
less specific statements of work and
adequate funding margin to cover the
anticipated changes.
The underlying
requirement that makes this relationship
possible is trust, built on a foundation of
past performance and mutual dedication to
the program’s success. If these elements are
lacking then the customer driven change
process will be limited to the speed at which
contracts are renegotiated, typically an order
of magnitude slower or more.
Design initiated changes in all programs
need to be formally evaluated for their
impacts across all subsystems and mission
elements prior to approval being given to
implement the change. In smaller satellite
missions, the small size of the team makes
this process more streamlined since fewer
individuals are involved in making the
decisions and evaluating the impacts.
Communication in these small groups can
often be less formal and are easier to
arrange. The other factor working in favor
of small missions is that the short time scale
of development means that communications
don’t have to persist for 5, 10 or 15 years, so
they can be documented less rigorously.
For the TacSat-2 mission many of the
changes in the design and implementation of
the mission were documented via e-mail
instead of with formal change paper.
Formal change paper, listing “was” and
“now” details and collecting impacts was
reserved for changes which altered the
interface between organizations including
Terrance Yee
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ICD’s or requirements. Another successful
strategy used was to delegate authority for
change control to individual payload or
subsystem leads if the change did not affect
any team members outside that particular
organization. This system works well only
when all the subsystem leads make sure to
involve systems engineering at the bus or
program level as appropriate whenever there
is a question about possible impacts outside
their subsystem or payload.

At the subsystem level, design changes are
tracked on a redline record sheet for
structures, on a change log for power and
mass budgets, in the Microsoft CVS system
for software (ground, test, and flight), and in
the change log for the harness wire diagrams
for harnessing.
For thermal, the lead
engineer documented the current state of his
design and kept it up to date with any new
information as soon as he received it. The
format used for this was a comprehensive
CDR quality PowerPoint presentation. This
had the added benefits of making the current
state of his subsystem immediately
understandable to anyone on the program
and eliminated the need to specifically
prepare other materials for any of the normal
design reviews.
At the bus system level, a log was kept of all
bus changes driven by external factors. This
log listed the authorizing entity in the
program organization, the nature of the
change, effective date, and top level impacts
to the bus. In addition, all system level
documents such as the requirements and the
ICD’s contained a version or change log to
describe the differences in each updated
release. These documents, when changed,
also had an associated change record as
described earlier. Changes affecting cost,
schedule, or deliverables still needed to be
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approved by the full change board including
customer representatives and negotiated
with a contract modification. For each of
these changes each subsystem was polled for
impacts. For the major changes a full
impact study was conducted to formally
evaluate how to best implement the change
and trade the various options.
Cost,
schedule, risk and technical performance in
each subsystem would be evaluated for these
trades with detailed impacts provided to
assist in the justification of proposed cost
increases.
These formal studies were
reserved for major questions such as the
potential addition of new payloads,
consideration of different launch vehicles, or
major configuration changes in the
spacecraft affecting multiple systems. On
TacSat-2 there were only seven instances of
changes that were evaluated in this
systematic way.
All other changes were handled informally
by the engineering team by just involving
the particular groups affected by the
technical change. Due to collocation of all
the bus subsystem leads, this coordination of
bus only design changes frequently took the
form of simply walking down the hallway
and gathering all the stakeholders for a
quick stand up meeting to decide minor
issues or to at least determine a lead for a
particular change topic and assign action
items to support coming to a decision.
The net effect of this delegation of change
control authority to lower levels where
appropriate was to greatly streamline the
process and allow the engineering team to
keep up with the fast pace of development.
It also resulted in a system that did not
automatically push a large amount of detail
information to the top level of management,
but still kept that information available when
needed.
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Once the program moved into payload
integration and test, all design documents
were copied onto a master CVS server at the
site of I&T. This central repository was
updated with changes on an almost daily
basis and this became the gold standard for
finding current information about any aspect
of the spacecraft or mission.
After a change decision had been made and
documented,
responsibility
for
implementing the change would be
delegated back to the subsystem or payload
lead(s) responsible for impacted areas.
Progress on implementation of major
changes was reported as part of the regular
weekly status meetings.
TacSat-2 Update
TacSat-2 has successfully completed system
thermal vacuum testing and vibration and
shock testing.
Payload integration is
complete and all major system test
milestones should be complete by the time
of the publication of this paper. The mission
is manifested for a November 13, 2006
launch aboard a Minotaur I launch from the
Virginia Spaceport. As of the submission of
this paper, all but a dozen or so open issues
have been successfully dealt with and
closed. The team is currently preparing for
launch and mission operations. Some initial
simulations of operations have been run and
more rehearsals are scheduled in preparation
for the launch.
The journey from initial mission concept
pictured in Figure 1 has seen the addition of
several payloads, the deletion of some, a
major configuration change to the mounting
of our primary instrument, a change of orbit,
and a change of launch vehicle. Throughout
this process, the techniques described in this
paper have been used to keep the bus portion
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of the work on schedule and ensure mission
success with a minimum of rework.
Conclusions
Changes need to be accommodated on a
rapid time scale for small satellites to be
successful.
Recognizing this fact and
planning for it at the beginning of a project
can greatly improve the chances of staying
on budget and on schedule. Setting clear
groundrules and processes for handling
change early can save considerable expense
and difficulty later in the project. Specific
recommendations include keeping the
statements of work general enough to avoid
renegotiation
for
smaller
changes,
adequately funding efforts to include a
management reserve to deal with the
changes, keeping adequate system margins
on technical resources such as mass, power,
I/O interfaces, etc. The process of dealing
with changes when they occur can also be
streamlined by delegating authority to deal
with compartmentalized changes at the
subsystem level, relying on less formal
communications such as e-mail and design
descriptions instead of formal change paper
for the less serious changes, and making
sure to institute general documentation
practices that are easy to keep up to date and
still capture the important steps in a design’s
evolution.
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